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Abstract 
 
Quantifying the Impacts of Regulatory Delay on Housing Affordability 
and Quality in Austin, Texas 
 
Megan Elizabeth Shannon, M.S.C.R.P. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Jacob Wegmann 
 
Regulatory delay during site plan review of multifamily projects in Austin has 
three primary impacts: 1) it generates unexpected development costs which increases 
housing prices over-time; 2) it stifles innovation and decreases quality of development; 
and 3) it promotes exurban growth. These impacts reduce affordability and quality of life 
for all Austinites and thwart the goals of the Imagine Austin comprehensive plan.  
As regulatory delays have increased remarkably since 2009, strong rent growth 
has compensated for this growing uncertainty throughout the Austin market. If regulatory 
delays are eliminated and developers receive approvals for multifamily projects within 
the 120 day mandate instead of the 223 day average, renters could see relief of 4-5% on 
their rent, or an average of $60 per month or $720 annually in Central Austin. Interviews 
with 14 Austin-area residential developers confirm these delays, costs, and impacts on 
their projects.  
On average it takes 3.5 additional months to receive site plan approvals in Austin 
in addition to the code mandated four month cycle. Austin’s peer cities fare differently. 
The average delay in Denver, Colorado is three weeks, and is just several days in 
Raleigh, North Carolina. Whereas land use regulations theoretically generate positive 
 vi
externalities, delays in administering those regulations generate no benefits to the 
community. 
During this unforeseen 3.5 months, developers accrue unexpected costs such as 
legal fees, and developer overhead which includes the opportunity costs of not pursuing 
other deals. Construction costs increase during delays, and developers must continue to 
pay for land options and carry costs. In the short-term, developers pay for these 
unexpected costs out-of-pocket, and by reducing construction costs, which can result in 
lower quality materials or amenities. Unexpected costs roll into the project’s overall 
budget, resulting in more expensive development projects. More expensive projects 
require higher rents in order to maintain the development team’s expected yield on cost.  
Further, interviews with urban designers and civil engineers reveal that regulatory 
delay stifles private sector innovation in the built environment. Developer interviews and 
case studies suggest that regulatory delay promotes exurban growth instead of urban infill 
in the Austin metropolitan area.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 For at least 30 years there has been a strong local public debate over the efficacy of 
the City of Austin’s development review process. Neighborhood groups perceive too 
much power resting with developers, while the real estate community perceives an anti-
development sentiment from city staff and neighborhoods (Zucker 2015). The debate has 
morphed into a problematic dialectic, where stakeholders espouse an “us vs. them” 
attitude. A highly anticipated report which reviewed the workflow and staff and 
stakeholder perceptions of the Planning and Development Review Department (PDRD) 
was published in March 2015 by Zucker Systems Inc. This report identifies many of the 
same problems and recommends many of the same strategies for improvement as a 
strikingly similar report published by the same company in 1987. Some stakeholders in 
Austin’s planning and development community have participated in focus groups in both 
study periods 27 years apart, and wonder why nothing has changed (Zucker 2015). The 
report identifies that significant delays during permit approvals have for many years been 
a prominent community issue. Civil engineers report a lengthening of approximately one 
month per year since the economic recovery began in 2010.1   
 
 The City of Austin’s current and aspirational peer cities such as Denver, CO, 
Portland, OR and communities within California’s Silicon Valley region2 have 
experienced similar public debate and regulatory delays. Similar to Austin, third parties 
published documents resembling Austin’s troubling Zucker Report. As a result, 
leadership in these cities streamlined permitting processes and tightened review 
timelines. These communities continue to monitor staff and stakeholder satisfaction 
against realistic and measurable performance metrics. As a result, they incentivize strong 
local economies and moderate housing prices, and increase the quality of the built 
                                                 
1 Anonymous civil engineer firm in Austin, in discussion with the author, March 2015. 
2 While Silicon Valley is not typically referred to as a peer city to Austin, often the two are considered 
economic competitors for tech companies, educated workers, and millennials. In this context it is a useful 
comparison for a discussion around economic competitiveness and quality of life as it is impacted by delay.  
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environment. These communities identified problems and implemented solutions in just a 
few years. If Austin truly wishes to be likened to the renowned urban design and quality 
of life enjoyed by Denver and Portland, and remain economically competitive with other 
technologically innovative and creative regions such as Raleigh, NC and Silicon Valley, 
there is much work to be done.  
Austin is making forward progress in its planning processes as it rewrites its land 
development code through 2018 and grapples with ways to meaningfully apply the 
Imagine Austin comprehensive plan. However, for some time city staff and stakeholders 
alike have identified a strong undercurrent of inefficient administration of the city’s land 
use regulations, recently highlighted in the Zucker Report (2015). One of the prominent 
issues within PDRD identified by both staff and stakeholders is excessive and frequent 
delays in the development review and permit approval process.  
The Zucker Report found from focus groups and staff interviews that site plan 
reviews 1) take too long, 2) are not comprehensive and lack consistency among reviews 
and plans, and 3) reviewers continue to add items throughout the review process and “nit-
pick” on insignificant issues unrelated to the standards of the land development code 
(Zucker 2015). Further, the Zucker team found that the 90% performance standard for 
on-time review cycles for these site plans (120 calendar days) is simply not being met. 
“Many of the reviews are not comprehensive which leads to too many multiple review 
cycles”, and multiple reviews increases the total cycle approval time (Zucker 2015, 266). 
In the context of this paper, regulatory delay refers to unmet timelines in the exchange of 
comments and permits between development applicants and city staff.  
 
The sources of and solutions to regulatory delay are well documented in Austin 
(Opticos Design 2014; Austin Business Journal 2014; Community Impact News 2014; 
Zucker Report 2015). Also well documented are the effects of land use regulations 
themselves on housing markets and development costs (Ben-Joseph 2003; Glaeser & 
Gyourko 2003; Malpezzi 1996; May 2005; Mayer 2000; Quigley & Raphael 2004). What 
is not as well documented however are the impacts of regulatory delay on a city’s 
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economy and built environment. But one study published in March 2015 explores the 
effects of regulatory delay on residential subdivision development and is referenced 
throughout this paper (Wrenn & Irwin 2015). The intent of this report is to quantify the 
costs of delay in order to elevate the conversation from one of blame and mistrust to one 
of economic vitality and affordability. Through quantitative analysis and qualitative 
methods this work develops a tangible discussion about the impacts of delay on housing 
affordability, quality, and regional success both in the public and private interest.  
Methods 
This paper is separated into six sections. Following the introduction, the second 
section characterizes and defines regulatory delay by distinguishing between the 
regulations themselves and the administration of regulations. Section III defines 
timeframes and sources of delay in Austin, and looks at case studies from current and 
aspirational peer cities. Section IV describes how delay hurts communities as a whole 
more than it hurts individual developers. Section V studies the existing empirical 
evidence and academic regression analyses which suggest a significant relationship 
between time and cost of development, and time and price to consumer. Section VI 
describes the development process and the categories of costs that are impacted by delay, 
and how developers accrue and account for implicit costs as a result of regulatory delay. 
Finally, Section VII summarizes the quantitative analysis of how delays during site plan 
review and construction increase the cost of development and ultimately the price of 
housing to consumers throughout the region.  
In addition to a review of the academic literature on this issue, this study 
benefited greatly from the ever evolving and hotly debated public process centered on the 
release of the Zucker Report (March 2015) in Austin and the forthcoming changes to 
Austin’s Planning and Development Review Department. Further, this study benefited 
from interviews with 14 Austin-based developers, two contractors, two urban designers, 
and three civil engineers who represent developers. All interviewees elected to remain 
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anonymous. While not all are quoted in this paper, their insights, experiences, and 
conversations enabled the analysis throughout this study.  
Delay in Austin  
A hot topic of conversation among all stakeholders amidst Austin’s rapid 
urbanization is the rate at which the city is becoming unaffordable for many long-time 
residents and middle and lower income people. In the 1990s Austin became the least 
affordable housing market in Texas when median home prices rose by 71% between 
1990 and 1998 (Mueller 2004). In more recent years, the Harvard Joint Center for 
Housing Studies’ report The State of the Nation’s Housing 2014 found that among renters 
and homeowners, 36% of Austin households spend more than 30% of their monthly 
income on housing, and 17% spend more than 50% of their income on housing.  
Renters are disproportionately impacted; 49% of all renters in Austin are spending 
more than 30% of their monthly income on rent and an additional 26% spend more than 
50% of their monthly income on rent (HJCHS 2014). However, Austin’s housing 
affordability is in-line with trends across the rest of the United States. The same Harvard 
study found that 50% of renters in the United States spend 30% or more on housing, and 
28% pay more than 50% of their income on housing (HJCHS 2014). In Austin, this 
dynamic is due in large part to the combination of factors affecting the supply and 
demand of housing: considerable population growth, increasingly high land costs, uneven 
wage growth, and a legacy of low density development patterns (Community Action 
Network 2000).  
Between 2004 and 2013 average rents in the Austin area increased by 50%, while 
median incomes increased by just 9% (Toohey 2014). Regulatory factors such as 
significant delays in the city’s permit review processes, lack of developable land zoned 
for high density residential development, minimal “by-right” entitlements, and fierce 
neighborhood opposition to density and affordable housing also contribute to increasing 
housing prices in Austin. However striking, few of these factors are new to Austin’s 2015 
development landscape. For years advocates for affordable and attainable housing have 
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promoted land use and regulatory solutions to increase affordable housing, citing 
concerns over low-density development patterns and an overemphasis on the protection 
of single-family neighborhoods.  
Pressure to reform is growing from both for- and non-profit housing developers 
who wish to provide subsidized affordable and unsubsidized attainable housing, and from 
large employers dependent on a robust local workforce that can afford to live close to 
employment centers. While findings from the harsh Zucker Report (2015) and the land 
development code rewrite process led by Opticos Design provide vehicles for legal 
reform, what Austin also needs is a new way of framing this issue. Regulatory delay and 
inefficiency contributes to ever increasing housing prices for new and existing residents, 
pushing growth to exurban areas divorced from employment centers and public 
transportation. This dynamic, if unchanged, will affect the City of Austin’s ability to 
attract and retain large employers, manage traffic congestion, and continue to promote the 
quality of life for which the city has become famous. This paper quantifies the impact of 
regulatory delay on affordability, quality, and regional growth, thus developing a new 
lens for promoting and evaluating reform.  
  
Assessing the impacts of regulatory delay during permit approvals is particularly 
compelling at present because there is an opportunity to reduce and eliminate delay 
before Austin’s land development code is rewritten. Laws do not need to change to make 
improvements. Austin has reasonable benchmarks that can be better enforced and 
supported before the city’s land use regulations are streamlined and clarified by the code 
rewrite process.  
The land development code mandates timeframes by which the city must return 
comments to applicants, and a timeframe by which full-cycle applications should be 
approved/disapproved. According to the land development Code Diagnosis Report 
(Opticos 2014), only 50% of site plans are returned with initial comments to applicants 
within the legally mandated time frame of 20 days. Further, among all site plan 
applications in FY2014, just 10 to 24% of site plan applications were approved within the 
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120 calendar day timeframe (City of Austin Monthly Development Process Tracking 
2015). These figures strongly suggest that regulatory delay is real in Austin.  
 
Table I: Site Plan Permit Cycle Delay in Austin 
 
The table above shows the average site plan review cycles in Austin. As the code 
mandates 120 calendar days, this paper uses the difference between the 120 day mandate 
and the actual recorded average timeframe of 223 calendar days as the average 
regulatory delay in Austin. In FY13 and FY 14, this difference was 103 calendar days on 
average, approximately 3.5 months. For the purposes of this paper, the average delay in 
Austin adds on average 3.5 additional months to an already 120 day long, four month 
process. These figures include all site plans, including applicants that received time 
extensions. Including site plans with extensions is necessary because as the Zucker 
Report (2015) identifies through interviews of plan review staff, time extensions are very 
common, especially for discretionary projects. Nearly all of the developers interviewed 
for this project shared stories of delay on discretionary projects, and said that recently it 
has taken approximately 12 months to gain site plan approvals for these projects. As 
such, the average delay for projects which require increased density to provide more 
housing units is likely longer than 3-4 months, compounding the costs of delay over this 
time. However for simplicity and to remain conservative, 3.5 months of delay is modeled 
in this paper.  
Half of these developers separately suggested that they would accept a longer 
initial review period (for example 40 days instead of 20) if it was the only comprehensive 
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review period, thus eliminating the multiple cycles of comments, many of which are 
considered “boilerplate” by civil engineers who process many separate applications. 
 
A common public perception in Austin is that prompt development review, 
streamlined permitting approvals, and uninterrupted construction only increases 
developer’s profits, and reduces the power of neighborhood input. In fact, members of the 
public have a much greater stake in development review than they may realize. The 
findings of this report suggest that over-time, eliminating regulatory delays benefits 
the community at-large as much or more than individual developers.  
 
This work focuses on how the inefficient administration of land use regulations 
affects housing prices and the quality of development, and promotes growth in exurban 
areas. Quantitatively, this work examines how regulatory delay 1) increases housing 
prices (sales & rents) in new and existing development, and qualitatively explains how 
regulatory delay 2) diminishes the quality and innovative characteristics of this 
development, and 3) promotes leapfrog development. All three impacts degrade a 
community’s aesthetic appeal and quality of life.  
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Chapter II: Characterizing Delay  
The Role of Regulation 
It is first critical to distinguish between land use regulations themselves and the 
process by which those regulations are administered and applied to development 
applications. This paper does not focus on the merits of land use regulations but instead 
on the administration of those regulations. A number of studies over past decades have 
found “strong relationships between the overall degree of land use regulation and housing 
prices” (Quigley 2004, 206). In Quigley’s study (2004), his regression analysis indicates 
that “moving from a relatively unregulated to a highly regulated metropolitan area 
increases bottom quartile rents by more than a fifth and bottom quartile house values by 
more than three fifths.”  
Later a study by Quigley & Raphael concluded “housing prices and rents are 
indeed higher in cities with more stringent regulation of development and land use” 
(2005, 325). However, these studies on the relationship between land use regulation and 
housing prices do not account separately for regulatory delays associated with 
administering those regulations, nor do they account for the positive externalities that 
some regulations may produce. Schill’s work on the effects of regulation on new housing 
development reminds readers to consider other factors, where “in seeking to separate 
‘bad’ regulations from ‘good’ ones, it is extremely perilous to look solely at the effects of 
these regulations on the price of housing” (Schill 2005, 7). As such, this paper’s analysis 
is useful in its effort to separate regulatory delay from the regulations themselves.  
Austin land use activist Richard Maier’s 2014 paper quantified the effects of some 
of Austin’s land use regulations on housing costs. Maier analyzed how the cost to build a 
new single family home in Central Austin is increased by a menu of local land use 
regulations such as the Heritage Tree and McMansion Ordinances, among others. In this 
case the Heritage Tree Ordinance gives the builder the option of paying into an off-site 
mitigation/replacement fund, which by standard calculations would have cost this 
standard single family property with one Heritage Tree $14,400. The other option is to 
develop an on-site tree care plan for the tree, although the arborist recommended removal 
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due to its condition. The tree care plan cost $2,742; thus the builder elected this option as 
the less expensive route (Maier 2014).  
Austin’s McMansion Ordinance limits the height, massing, and impervious cover 
of single-family homes, making it difficult in this case to justify the land cost because of 
strict house size limits. Maier found that designing new homes to comply with the 
McMansion Ordinance require builders to commission custom floor plans and designs 
because each lot’s calculations are unique. The cost to the builder is $12,500 more than 
the typical $2,500 for stock floor plans (Maier 2014). While combined these ordinances 
could add $12,742 to the base home price, Maier’s work does not include the 
administration of those regulations and how delays increases housing costs and quality; 
indeed the impacts are greater if delay is taken into consideration.  
However, in some cases land use regulations generate positive externalities to the 
community at large that should be accounted for in a cost-benefit analysis. For example, 
while the Heritage Tree Ordinance may increase costs to build and prices to purchase 
housing, mature tree cover provides quantifiable benefits such as improved air quality, 
shade, reduced electric bills, and increased property values. These benefits should be 
considered in a true cost-benefit analysis. But whereas there are at least in principle 
broader public benefits of land use regulations, there are no quantifiable benefits to 
society to offset individual costs of regulatory delay.  
 
What is Delay? What isn’t Delay? 
Regulatory delays have been of concern to the development community for some 
time. This section clarifies what does and does not characterize modern regulatory delay. 
Working definitions come from a variety of sources. In the context of examining barriers 
to implementing new land use regulations, often regulatory approvals “consist of delays 
associated with permit processes and approvals that arise from cumbersome decision 
making processes and duplication of regulations” (May 2005, 2). Wrenn & Irwin’s work 
looks at expected approval times where delay is the discrepancy “between the time that 
the developer first applies for conditional approval and the time by which the developer 
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expects to gain final approval” (2015, 29). While the popular perception among 
neighborhood groups and city staff is that developers are concerned primarily with the 
merits of land use regulations, the reality is that developers across the United States cite 
few issues with clear and easy to interpret regulations that are applied with 
straightforward and predictable review processes.  
Developer interviews conducted during Eran Ben-Joseph’s study (2003, 7) on 
practices and attitudes toward subdivision regulations identified that “what hurt[s] are the 
inconsistent approval times and regulation changes […] the biggest problem […] with 
regulations is not the regulations themselves, but the various interpretations by staff and 
zoning officials.” Delay is most problematic to developers because it is unpredictable, 
hard to control, and ultimately expensive. Further, the uncertainty produced during 
periods of regulatory delay is especially problematic for developers because it increases 
investment risk in projects. Investment risk must be compensated by higher returns, 
which in turn increase the price of the real estate project for the consumer up to the point 
the market will bear. If the expected returns and resulting base rents or sales prices are 
higher than the market can bear, projects will not get built.  
For the purposes of this paper, regulatory delay is the difference between 
statutory review and approval periods and actual recorded review and approval periods. 
Delay during construction is harder to track, but theoretically straightforward to analyze 
from a time value of money and cost of capital perspective. In the absence of reliable data 
recording delays during construction, this paper relies on interviews with local developers 
and consultants to understand common sources and lengths of regulatory delay during 
construction. Both delays during approvals and construction are characterized by 
inefficiency within the local government’s land use reviewing body.  
The land development code mandates a time frame by which comments, reviews, 
and approvals to permit applications must occur. Within the umbrella of development 
review there are three categories of commercial real estate permits in Austin: site plans, 
subdivisions/plats, and building permits. For a multifamily development, a developer will 
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typically apply for subdivision plats, a site plan permit, and a building permit(s) for 
vertical construction.  
 
Chart I: Site Plan Review Cycle in Austin (120 Day Code Requirement)   
 
 
This paper focuses on site plan permits, as these permits are associated with the 
longest delays and experience the highest level of scrutiny in Austin. The chart above 
reflects Austin’s site plan permit approval workflow as mandated by the land 
development code. Austin as well as most mid-large size municipalities track actual 
review and approval times as part of departmental performance measures, often reporting 
a percentage of on-time completions within these legal mandates. Delays technically 
begin within the first lapsed day after the legal benchmark period. As such delay can vary 
widely from one day to even theoretically 1,000 days. The chart below shows the 
mandated vs. average recorded site plan approval cycle in Austin.  
 
Chart II: Statutory vs Average Site Plan Review Cycle Work Flow in Austin  
 
 
The chart above reflects the differences in Austin between the statutory approval 
guidelines vs. the actual recorded site plan approval time lines. The difference between 
the 120 day benchmark and the 2233 actual recorded average figure for FY14 is the 
average regulatory delay period in Austin’s site plan approval process.  
                                                 
3The City of Austin tracks average monthly site plan review timeline for all applications. For FY14, the 
average site plan review timeline was 223 calendar days, which is 103 days longer than the 120-day code 
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Delay is not necessarily, although it can be, a direct product of land use 
regulations. As found in Austin’s Code Diagnosis (Opticos 2014) and Zucker Report 
(2015), Austin’s complex land use regulations are difficult to administer and interpret by 
city staff, which can create delays. However, successful reform in other cities (ie Denver, 
Portland, & Raleigh) shows that with well versed staff and an educated development, 
design, and engineering community, even complex and clearly defined regulations can be 
well managed. As a report published by the American Institute of Architects states, “there 
are differences in the way that municipalities apply these controls. Successful processes 
can be extensive, but clear. Their expectations can be great, but known. The reviews can 
be deliberate, but timely” (AIA 2003, 4). As such, regulatory delay is the product of 
inconsistent and unpredictable administration of regulation that results in unexpected 
lengthening of the mandated review timelines.  
Ben-Joseph’s survey (2003, 7) asked developers to choose the most burdensome 
among seven components of land use regulations, including the limits of the regulations 
themselves. Among the seven choices, “unnecessary delays” and the “impacts of local 
administrative discretion” (tied) each were cited as the most burdensome aspects of 
regulation. Here the option “limits of the regulations themselves” ranked last (excluding 
“other”) among the choices. 
 
Regulatory delay is not caused by fees imposed on developers. Many 
municipalities require developers to pay impact fees to help cities pay for infrastructure 
that will serve the new development. A well regarded and cited study by Mayer & 
Somerville (2000, 1) on the impacts of fees finds that “development or impact fees have 
relatively little impact on new construction.” A separate framework established by 
Pindyck (1993) and elaborated on by Wrenn & Irwin (2015) considers these one-time 
expected fees de jure costs, as opposed to the de facto costs incurred during unexpected 
delay. As such, “regulations that lengthen the development process […] have larger and 
                                                 
mandated timeline. This number is the average of ten months of monthly average review timeline data, 
removing the minimum and maximum among the 12 monthly averages.   
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more significant effects” (Mayer & Somerville 2000, 1), largely due to these ongoing and 
unpredictable de facto costs. This finding is significant but not surprising, as a developer 
can include these expected de jure costs in their project or land budget, given that the 
timing is clear and well communicated by the municipality. De facto costs, by contrast, 
are difficult to manage. 
There are some cases of regulatory delay caused by a municipality that are not 
due to administrative inefficiency but are instead the result of rules involving adequate 
public facilities, known as concurrency. Such rules “raise the possibility of denying new 
development because of its anticipated effects on road congestion, water supply, or 
sewage treatment facilities” (Quigley 1997, 53). Some communities may legally craft 
concurrency regulations, sometimes in the form of adequate public facility ordinances 
(APFO), without imposing an illegal development moratorium. As described by White & 
Paster (2003, 753), an adequate public facilities ordinance is a 
land use regulation that is designed to ensure that necessary public facilities and 
services to support new development are available and adequate, based on adopted 
level of service (LOS) standards, at the time that the impacts of new development 
occur. APFOs are designed to manage the timing, not the location or quality, of new 
development. 
  
This version of delay can be anticipated by developers – indeed, an APFO provides 
developers predictable enough information about where, when, and how much 
development may occur. An APFO is legally justified by its strong public purpose: cities 
need adequate public facilities to provide uniform standards of service across the 
jurisdiction. In this way, concurrency rules are not included within this paper’s discussion 
of regulatory delay.  
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Chapter III: Identifying & Addressing Delay  
Sources of Delay 
While not the focus of this paper, it is useful to identify the most common sources 
of regulatory delay. In recent investigations, the Zucker Report (2015, 286) and Code 
Diagnosis (2014) have outlined several key sources of regulatory delay in Austin:  
Lengthy review time frames; Multiple review cycles; Heavy case volumes and 
uneven caseloads; Lengthy applicant turn-around times; Incomplete plans; Lack 
of good first reviews; An overly complex Land Development Code, that is 
continually amended; City policies that generally require all issues to be resolved 
prior to project approval instead of allowing project approval subject to 
conditions that resolve outstanding issues; Postponements and appeals by 
interested parties; and Time extensions.  
 
These sources of delay are neither new nor unique to Austin. Locally, longtime 
stakeholders cite lack of motivation by staff to review applications quickly, and cite 
staff’s lack of understanding of the developer’s process as other key reasons for delay. 
The city’s frequent deference to powerful and vocal neighborhood groups can also 
increase the development timeline, particularly in rezoning cases. Zucker (2015, 286) 
reports of “numerous code and policy issues that are intended to provide lots of 
neighborhood input,” allowing for delay of up to 365 days over the normal 180-day 
application expiration. Zucker makes 464 separate recommendations for improving the 
entire PDRD, 74 of which are directed toward land use review services alone. Many of 
these 464 recommendations were first made in the 1987 publication. It is important to 
recognize that some delay is caused by applicants. Though these reasons are not as well 
documented, delays by applicants can be caused by lenders and financial partners making 
changes to the project, changes to building uses and layouts due to tenant negotiations, 
and ongoing negotiations with landowners. The timeline for applicants to turn-around 
comments has been increasing as well. A large Central Austin civil engineering firm 
comments that a primary source is because many complex projects receive 6-10 pages of 
“boilerplate” comments that review staff include with most first round comments, many 
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of which are indeed answered throughout the application and construction documents.4 
Reviewers have increased the level of scrutiny for a site development permit in recent 
years, including detailed and specific engineering questions that take time to answer.  
 
Regulatory Delay is Not a New Issue  
The issue of delay is not new in the United States. Studies observing development 
approvals began in the 1970s and show that since then “there has been a steady increase 
in approval and processing time” (Ben-Joseph 2003, 1). Other studies show that a marked 
increase in housing prices occurred toward the end of the 1970s, which some researchers 
link to the rapid increase in regulation on development, particularly environmental 
regulation and growth management controls enacted during the 1970s in coastal cities 
(Glaeser 2003). Over the past four decades, “the cost of housing is being driven up by an 
increasingly expensive and time-consuming permit approval process […] though such 
debates are not new” (Ben-Joseph 2003, 1). As stated, the relationship among regulation, 
delay, and housing prices is not a new phenomenon. However the impacts are 
multiplying across the United States and as time progresses: “since 1976, the process has 
increased in its complexity, in the number of agencies involved, the number of delays in 
the approval process, and the adding of new requirements” (Ben-Joseph 2003, 1). 
Further, this same study cites no change in the percent of developer respondents who cite 
delay as the most burdensome aspect of regulation between 1976 and 2002 (26%). This is 
striking and suggests that quickening review timelines has not been of high priority in 
many American cities over the last 30 years.  
As mentioned previously, regulatory delay is not new in Austin either. The first 
page of the draft Zucker Report (2015, 3) states: “Paul Zucker, President of Zucker 
Systems led a team of five national planning and development experts on a three day trip 
to Austin in 1987 and issued a report called, Improving the Development Regulatory 
Process in Austin. Many of the issues discussed in 1987 (some 27 years ago) still 
                                                 
4 Anonymous civil engineering firm in discussion with the author, February 2015.  
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remain.” A critical issue identified in 1987 still exists – the so called “Austin Way.” The 
1987 report (Zucker 2015, 3) described it in this way:  
The so called “Austin Way” contains an unhealthy dose of suspicion. This lack of trust 
became evident in the desire by both staff and citizens to over-document everything, to 
dot every “i” and cross every “t”, the tendency to create new commissions along with 
each new ordinance, unwillingness to delegate more decisions to staff and staff’s 
feelings that if they make a mistake, they may be crucified. In the long run every detail 
cannot be documented. This kind of system will break down and sink of its own weight. 
We are not suggesting that the Austin Way be abandoned, rather that it be kept in 
perspective.  
 
The Zucker team remains supportive of such reforms amidst today’s development 
landscape. If change is to happen within the City of Austin’s land use review department, 
the city must employ strong leadership, enforce existing time lines, and streamline 
complex land use review processes. In March 2015, Austin city manager Marc Ott 
divided the PDRD into two separate departments: planning and zoning, and development 
review (Austin Business Journal 2015). The impacts of this new structure are unrealized. 
 
Delay is not Unique to Austin 
Regulatory delay does not afflict Austin alone. Regulatory delay and pressures to 
reform are most prevalent in expensive and fast growing cities that struggle to keep pace 
with increasing volume of development applications and adjust their systems and psyche 
to rapid infill development. Indeed, studies published in Denver (2003), Portland (2002), 
Philadelphia (2010), and Silicon Valley (1994) reflect nearly the same sources of delay 
and frustration by stakeholders as in Austin. These cities cite stifling economic effects 
and increases in development costs as the drivers for reform. In response to reports, these 
cities have made explicit decisions to reform their land use review processes. If the City 
of Austin’s elected officials, departmental leaders, and urban populace wish to emulate 
the cities it so often describes as peers, then it is useful to examine several of these case 
studies.  
While Philadelphia is not a peer city, it is interesting to briefly look into the 
analysis of how regulatory delay affects development costs in Philadelphia. A 
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consultant’s analysis of Philadelphia’s development review process reports that 5% of 
development costs are attributed to administrative delays (Hseuh 2010), not dissimilar to 
the later findings of this study (2015). Communities more comparable to Austin, and 
communities to which Austin strives to be likened are examined here and include Denver, 
CO, Portland, OR, Raleigh, NC, and economic competitors within California’s Silicon 
Valley. All of these communities cite economic growth and competitiveness as a key and 
primary driver for regulatory reform.  
 
Table II: Comparative Data for Austin’s Current Peer & Aspirational Peer Cities 
 
 
Delay and Reform in Denver  
In 2003, the Denver chapter of the American Institute of Architects commissioned a 
study titled “Denver’s Development Review Process: Can It Be Fixed?” The report was 
supported by a larger inclusive group of stakeholders, called the Citizens to Streamline 
Our Permitting Process (STOPP), who presented the report to then Mayor John 
Hickenlooper, now governor of Colorado. The report focused on how delays and 
inefficiencies in the development review process hurt Denver’s economy. Many of the 
issues reported in Denver are similar to those outlined in Austin’s Zucker reports from 
1987 and 2015, including (AIA 2005, 2):  
Unnecessary delays; Unpredictability, including reversals of direction and additions of 
requirements late in the process; Personal interpretations of lawfully promulgated 
regulations; Conflicting requirements between departments; Lack of a mechanism to 
resolve conflicts; Lack of a coherent process for accommodating unconventional projects.  
 
These issues were not unique to Denver, nor are they unique to Austin. The difference 
among communities is how leadership decides to move forward and reform these 
City
Population/
Square Mile
Median Household 
Income (U.S. $52,176)
Growth Rate 
2000‐2010
% of Pop. 25+ 
With Bachelor's
Employed in Creative 
Occupation (U.S. 19%)
Austin (Travis Co.) 2,907          $58,084 20% 45% 36%
Denver (Denver Co.) 3,874          $50,728 8% 40% 32%
Portland (Mult. Co.) 4,567          $51,859 10% 44% 30%
Raleigh (Wake Co.) 2,789          $64,993 46% 47% 38%
Sources: American Community Survey 2013 3‐Year Estimate; USDA Creative Class County Codes
Income & employment figures are for the county, all other figures are for the city proper
Austin's Current Peer & Aspirational Cities
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problematic processes. The STOPP report powerfully stated that “wasted time in plan 
review limbo means wasted costs to owners, design professionals and the City, alike” 
(AIA 2003,16), successfully making the case that regulatory delay affects the entire 
community. 
Since 2003, Denver has made great strides to streamline its development review 
and permitting processes, including enforcement of existing timelines for approvals. 
Denver has realized a boom in commercial development, much of which is high quality 
and award winning for its adaptive reuse and innovation. For example many qualified and 
deserving projects compete annually for ULI Colorado’s Impact Award categories for 
Infill and Innovation. One notable reform is the institution of pre-application conferences, 
as is also done in Dallas and San Diego. Before an applicant submits a formal application 
for site plan review, the City of Denver requires an in-person concept plan conference. 
Applicants bring in preliminary site drawings and/or building elevations in order for 
reviewers to make sure the plan has a high likelihood of approval and is in regulatory 
compliance before formal submission. During the conference, a case manager and 
representatives from all reviewing departments – fire, zoning, water, survey and planning 
– are present.  
This pre-submission conference prevents delay during official review periods and 
saves applicants costs to their consultants. Once formal plans are submitted, and the 
application is deemed complete, the development review case manager distributes the 
plans to different reviewers within one business day. Comparatively, it takes four to six 
weeks for applicants to navigate the City of Austin’s completeness check process, where 
it should take no more than five to ten days, according to the land development code 
(City of Austin 2014). After intake, Denver’s reviewers are required to return coordinated 
written comments on the formal plans within three weeks to the applicant. With 
exceptions for large complex commercial projects, generally the three week comment 
review period threshold is met, largely because complex issues are resolved in person 
during concept plan review (City of Denver Development Services 2015). In Austin this 
initial review period is recorded as 30-45 days instead of 20 (Austin Performance Metrics 
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2015). The impacts of this simple, efficient reform are considerable for developers and 
the community, as review times in Denver have been reduced by half to two-thirds. Now 
the average delay is approximately three weeks total (City of Denver Performance 
Review), or 21 calendar days compared to Austin’s 103 average calendar days of delay.  
 
Delay and Reform in Portland 
Portland serves as a strong model of development service regulatory reform in the United 
States. Motivated to maintain long term economic stability and success, in 2002 the 
mayor and city council drafted the Final Regulatory Improvement Workplan which was 
designed to streamline permitting and established a flexible regulatory system highly 
responsive to the market. The workplan also built into city government the process of 
continuous improvement to land use regulations, administration, customer service, 
procedures and fee calculations. This report reflects an ongoing community wide 
approach to constant improvement and responsiveness to the market. Each year the 
council and mayor report on and draft improvements to the workplan; thus, it is an ever 
evolving document. The discussion draft for 2015 includes mandatory (as opposed to 
voluntary) pre-application conferences to be held prior to land use review, expedited 
procedures for smaller projects, and 45 other feasible, ongoing recommendations for 
clarifying, streamlining, and improving the development process in Portland in 2015. 
 
Delay and Reform in the Silicon Valley 
 In 1994 a non-profit task force representing the cities of Palo Alto, Sunnyvale, San Jose, 
Fremont, Mountain View, and San Carlos, CA was created in response to examples of 
local government’s slow permitting processes hindering the competitive position of these 
fast growing cities. Hewlett Packard reported that the cost of building permit delays cost 
the company $1 million for every month a permit was delayed (AIA 2003, 23). This local 
task force challenged local leadership and municipal development services to streamline 
and overhaul permit approvals as a way to stimulate economic development.  
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As a result of this grassroots pressure, combined with innovation among the 
Silicon Valley workforce, the SmartPermit system was established and used in these 
cities throughout the 1990s, and served as a model across the country. While seemingly 
rudimentary by 2015, the SmartPermit system was revolutionary in 1994, allowing 
applicants to check status of permits, submit plans, and apply and pay for permits online. 
Twenty-one years later, the City of Austin still does not offer electronic plan submission 
and electronic payment options. Though in March 2015 the Austin Business Journal 
reported that the City of Austin is testing a new electronic payment and plan submission 
system, to go live sometime in 2015, which will greatly improve upon the current system.   
As in Denver and Portland, reform in the Silicon Valley was motivated by the 
region’s need to stay responsive to the market and continue to provide a robust housing 
and commercial development sector, vital to its prominent role in economic development 
and innovation in the United States. 
  
Table III: Comparative Site Plan Permit Cycles  
 
 
 
 
 
Initial Review: 
Benchmark
Initial Review: 
Recorded
Percent 
On‐Time
Austin 20 27 38%
Denver 15 n/a n/a
Portland 20 n/a 70%
Raleigh 10 10.96 72%
San Antonio 34 9.25 n/a
San Marcos 10 9 n/a
Comparative Site Plan Review Times, Working Days
Sources : City of Austin Monthly Development Process  Tracking; Cities  of Denver, Portland, 
Raleigh, and San Antonio development services  performance  measures ; City of San Marcos  Year 
in Review;  n/a  indicates  ci ty did not provide  this  information at time  of writing
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Performance in Raleigh 
The City of Raleigh’s Development Services department posts quarterly reports 
reflecting careful and rigorous performance measures for all types of plan reviews and 
approval rates. Raleigh reports the benchmark number of days for plan review next to the 
average actual days of review. The department has an ambitious goal of returning 90% of 
plans within the benchmark periods of 10 days for all submission cycles. The department 
also reports how late plans were, from 1-2 days, 3-4 days, and 5+ days. This level of 
reporting provides enough context for the average number of days to approval to be 
meaningful for purposes of anticipation by developers. The department is highly 
successful; the actual number of days to review initial site plans was between 10.36-
11.89 (Raleigh 2015).  
 
Other examples include Phoenix’s Customized Plan Review and Permit by 
Appointment processes. Established teams of reviewers work together in the same room 
to process coordinated comments in which the applicant is directly involved. The city 
reported reductions in approval cycles from 60-90 days to 10-45 days. Dallas, Denver, 
Phoenix, Raleigh, and San Diego offer or require concept plan conferences before formal 
site plan review periods, greatly reducing the turnaround time and complexity of 
comments during formal review periods.  
 
Key lessons for Austin include: 
 Coordinated, face-to-face time early in the process reduces review days;  
 Cities should report minimum and maximum review times, not just averages; 
 Regional economic vitality and preservation of local quality of life are key drivers 
for reform; and  
Successful reform begins with local groups who build a broad coalition of stakeholders 
and apply constant and well-informed pressure to local governments. 
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Chapter IV: Delay Hurts Communities 
Regulatory delay should be an important planning & public policy issue. Thus far 
this paper has established how and why regulatory delay exists in Austin and in other 
cities across the United States. This section discusses the key impacts of regulatory delay 
on a community, supporting the previously emboldened thesis that over-time delay hurts 
communities more than individual developers. The following categories of effects have 
serious, wide reaching impacts on nearly all members of the community. These issues 
should be of utmost concern to planners and policymakers in the context of regulatory 
reform, housing affordability, and growth management.  
 
Delay prevents the construction and filtering of housing 
Regulatory delay slows the construction of all new housing types and has two 
notable impacts on housing affordability: 1) stalling filtering, where filtering refers to the 
process where “construction of new housing for middle-income people frees up their old 
housing for lower-income people to occupy” (Baer & Myers 1998, 189); and 2) 
preventing lower end housing from being built entirely, when the minimum cost of the 
cheapest feasible development is raised. Further, Quigley’s research found that, although 
without separating the regulation from the administration, the largest price effects of 
regulation occur in the low end housing market (Quigley 2004, 207). Costs to develop 
with the additional burden of implicit costs caused by regulatory delay disproportionately 
affect developers in the market for housing attainable to low income populations. As 
housing prices have risen at a much fast rate than incomes, housing for the critical 
workforce has become increasing scarce. Further findings suggest that “to the extent that 
cities make it difficult to build new housing, any type of housing, the availability of low-
cost housing will be reduced and the affordability of all housing will decline” (Quigley 
2004, 205).  
Even without separating the costs of regulation from the delays caused by 
administering the regulations, researchers found that “moving from a lightly regulated 
environment to a heavily regulated environment would raise rents by 17%, increase 
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house values by 51%, and lower homeownership rates by 10%” (Malpezzi 2003, 225). 
While this finding cannot be used as a proxy for delay alone, the difference in rents and 
homeownership rates is striking. Highly regulated markets with delays remove several 
layers of affordability from the housing market entirely. In the most highly regulated 
markets such as New York and San Francisco, the market will fail to produce even 
middle income housing without subsidies, let alone low income housing.  
While Austin has not reached this level of regulation and constrained supply, and 
because of much of the city’s current development is happening in the outerskirts, 
concentrated pockets within Central Austin are beginning to produce housing for only 
high income residents. For example, the newly delivered 311 Bowie Street multifamily 
project in downtown Austin is commanding average rents of $3.42 per square foot, 
catering to residents with average incomes of $1M annually. The added burdens of 
regulatory delay will discourage development and housing rehabilitation in the first place, 
which limits the number of units produced entirely, and increases all levels of housing 
prices (May 2005, 4).  
Multifamily developments, the projects that tend to provide the majority of 
attainable and affordable housing in communities, suffer the most from this dynamic. The 
responsiveness of a community’s housing stock is weaker in more regulated areas. 
Quigley found that the slowest response among all housing starts is in the supply of 
multifamily housing units, “the source of supply that is most frequently the target of 
regulation” (Quigley & Raphael 2005, 328) and the most frequent source of attainable 
housing in communities. Because multifamily housing is subject to more stringent review 
and regulation, its developers suffer disproportionately from delays and therefore incur 
more implicit costs, which leads to higher base rents among new multifamily housing. If 
the market is not strong enough to absorb higher rents, developers will anticipate lower 
than expected returns, and thus projects will not be built.  
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Delay in practice is an exclusionary tactic 
In planning practice, exclusionary tactics refer to activities deployed by 
municipalities and neighborhood groups that regardless of intent, in effect greatly reduce 
or eliminate opportunities for certain segments of the population to access housing and 
services. For example, by limiting the amount of parcels zoned for multifamily 
development, a municipality effectively eliminates opportunities for affordable and 
attainable housing by reducing density and promoting single-family homes, regardless of 
their intent to do so. Researchers have found that “delays and length may be used as a 
tactic to exclude development” (Ben-Joseph 2003, 24) and to stall projects that a 
community does not want, to the point at which the project is significantly modified or 
abandoned by the developer. The same study found that “in higher income communities, 
approval of development takes longer than in those with lower incomes” (Ben-Joseph 
2003, 11). Across the country, “the time it takes to get an approval is much shorter in low 
and moderate income communities” (Ben-Joseph 2003, 24).  The results of this study 
find that as the percent of jurisdictions that implement growth control measures increases, 
the median income of those jurisdictions increases. Ben-Joseph concludes that 
“regulations are often a barrier to affordable housing, and are used as an exclusionary 
device by higher income communities” (Ben-Joseph 2003, 24).    
Another study found that “efforts to reduce construction through delay can be 
quite effective. In fact, repeated delay can be much more effective than the imposition of 
fees” (Mayer 2000, 21). As previously discussed, one-time de jure development costs 
(i.e. impact fees, taxes) are predictable and do not deter new construction cycles. 
However implicit costs incurred by developers during delay may move a project’s net 
present value below zero, forcing the developer and her investors to take serious risk, 
modify the project, or abandon it completely (Wrenn & Irwin 2015). In this way 
regulatory delay is a powerful deterrent of new construction.  
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Delay fuels growth at the urban edges  
Difficult and lengthy regulatory approval processes in central cities pushes 
developers to work in exurban communities. Bar-Ilan & Strange’s regression results 
indicate that “lags and uncertainty together can lead to so-called leapfrog development, 
where distant land is developed prior to the development of land that is closer to the city 
center” (1996, 88). In these edge communities, review times are quicker, neighborhood 
opposition is less robust, and in many cases the local government is motivated to incent 
new development. Indeed, slow and frustrating approval processes in Austin are pushing 
developers to work in other areas; as one developer says, “I can process projects in 
Round Rock, Cedar Park, Leander, Georgetown, Dripping Springs, etc. in less than ½ 
time with cooperation and helpful City Staff and Management.”5 Wrenn & Irwin found 
that “a one-month increase in expected approval time leads to a 13% reduction in the 
probability of development in areas primed for development, but that only leads to an 8% 
reduction in areas not primed for development” (2015, 26). This dynamic is counter to 
the intentions of the policies of the Imagine Austin comprehensive plan which aim to 
direct growth to specific, denser areas of the region.  
 Further, the implicit costs incurred by developers during regulatory delay have 
also resulted in fragmented urban growth and leapfrog development. Wrenn & Irwin 
(2015) argue that implicit costs favor the development of smaller residential subdivisions 
that are lower cost to developers. And because “smaller subdivisions tend to occur farther 
from urban areas, this difference in implicit costs has fostered greater exurban 
development” (Wrenn & Irwin 2015, 26). Regulatory delay has altered the spatial 
patterns of development in metropolitan areas in which it occurs.  
Regulatory delay pushes residential growth to exurban communities that may not 
necessarily have adequate public infrastructure or commercial development and 
employment to financially support a high volume of new residents. New development in 
these communities increases congestion as employment remains in Austin’s city center 
                                                 
5 Anonymous in discussion with the author, March 2015.  
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and nearby nodes, which increases demand for already overloaded freeways and grossly 
inadequate alternatives to them. These new edge developments outside of Austin do not 
provide the taxes necessary to support these expenses within the City of Austin, further 
burdening already high property taxes in Austin compared to other cities.  
 
Delay reduces the quality of development in communities 
Regulatory delay stifles innovation in real estate development and rewards 
prototypical development patterns. Delays during Austin’s review process combined with 
the overly prescriptive nature of the land development code inadvertently incentivizes 
monotonous ‘big box’ development patterns. This is true because such development is 
simple to review, complies with standard regulations, and requires no innovative thinking 
by reviewers.  
As a result, there is little incentive for developers within communities suffering 
from delay to innovate because the review time is so much longer compared to standard 
development practices. For example, in one case a developer of a new residential 
subdivision with a mixed use town center located in a designated Imagine Austin 
“activity node” ultimately abandoned its extensive green infrastructure water treatment 
plan for a traditional end-of-pipe system after experiencing delays during the site plan 
review process. Originally the developer, engineer, and land planner designed a green 
infrastructure system to detain and treat stormwater runoff using a network of rain 
gardens and a gray water system that would have provided enough water for the 
neighboring golf course. The developer experienced such pushback from review staff and 
delay in reviewing this water treatment plan that they ultimately chose to redesign the 
entire system to save time. This developer posed the ultimate question: “do you pay to 
wait, or pay to redesign?”6  
In this case, the developer could wait no longer for the city to comment and 
process their legal but innovative and atypical plan; instead they redesigned for a 
                                                 
6 Anonymous in discussion with the author, February 2015.  
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standard water treatment system, which the city reviewed promptly. This developer 
expressed a very human reaction to this process: frustration, of course, but failed attempts 
to be innovative and fulfill the promise of green infrastructure were perhaps the greatest 
disappointment of all. Further, future residents will pay in the sales price of their new 
home for the increased soft costs that the developer incurred by doing two sets of plans, 
and the time lost to delays. The developer said that he will spread these implicit costs out 
over the base price of the new homes. The developer wonders how serious the plan 
review staff is not only about implementing Imagine Austin, but more importantly 
providing Austin residents with attractive, environmentally sensitive, and high quality 
growth. Two civil engineering consultants who handle many projects in Austin cited 
similar delays and lack of cooperation from staff with getting approvals on green 
infrastructure projects, while within the legal confines of the current land development 
code, and fulfilling of Imagine Austin’s aspirational goals.7 Public green infrastructure 
projects provide an important precedent for future private sector approval. For example, 
the Ridgelea Greenspace Beautification Project in West Austin was awarded public 
matching funds for stormwater right of way improvements. Infrastructure is in place and 
plantings will occur in the fall of 2015.8  
 
After two developers and consultants representing developers also mentioned the 
same issue of “pay to wait, or pay to redesign?,” I began to ask other interviewees about 
this issue. Nine of the 14 developers said that during their last or current project they 
considered whether to wait out the delay and pay for it over time, or pay immediately to 
redesign plans and move forward with an alternative design that was, they admitted, less 
than ideal, but would either appease reviewers or be easier to review. However, redesign 
is expensive. In one case, “we’ve charged the client $105,000 for two zoning 
applications, a replat, and a giant site development plan set that went in the trash […and] 
                                                 
7 Anonymous in discussion with the author, March 2015. 
8 See https://austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Public_Works/Neighborhood_Partnering_Program/ 
Revised_Ridglea_Application_Summary.pdf for more information.  
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he’s not even in the door for review yet.”9 Developers must weigh costs of redesign with 
carry costs accrued during delays. Development review departments, such as Austin’s, 
beleaguered by delays are actually incentivizing the standard development patterns they 
so desperately wish to discourage.  
 
There are other ways that quality is diminished by regulatory delay. In theory 
there is a finite amount of money a developer can spend on a given portion of a project in 
order to meet expected returns. Money spent on extensive use of consultants and carry 
costs during delays could otherwise be spent on amenities and innovative design. One 
developer severely impacted by regulatory delays in the license agreement process, 
caused by discrepancies in plan interpretations between Austin Energy and PDRD, 
lamented that money he is spending on attorney fees and plan redesigns “could have been 
money spent elsewhere on the project”10 to improve amenities or unit finishes. Eight of 
the 14 developers I interviewed considered money spent during periods of regulatory 
delay as “wasted” and wished they had spent it on parts of the project that would have 
increased its value and appeal to future consumers. One way for a developer to sustain 
the implicit costs accrued during regulatory delay is to take money out of other project 
budget items, which can reduce the quality and value of the project.  
Developers of an infill residential community in South Austin described a 
situation where delays caused by a neighborhood zoning case degraded the ultimate 
quality of the project and raised the sales prices of the units. As originally proposed, this 
project achieved many goals of Imagine Austin and the city’s written design guidelines 
for how it wishes to grow in a compact and connected manner: rear alleys for parking, 
clustered units to allow for maximum open space, and centrally located amenities. 
Closely clustered and in some cases attached units allowed per square foot construction 
prices to be lower, which would keep the sales price lower relative to construction costs. 
However as the neighborhood fought the increased density and as time dragged on, the 
                                                 
9 Anonymous in discussion with the author, February 2015.  
10 Anonymous in discussion with the author, March 2015. 
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developer decided to settle for a less dense zoning category in order to keep the project 
viable. Now the units are detached and farther apart than originally planned. As a result, 
the entire community suffers from a greatly reduced amount of open space to 
accommodate the new distance between each unit. The developer noted that the quality of 
the overall project and its amenities were diminished by the delay, as the soft cost budget 
was inflated due to redesigning the site plan after the zoning compromise.11  
Of concern to an entire jurisdiction is the issue that lower density development is 
expensive for the municipality to maintain, and thus costs taxpayers more in the long 
term. Kotchen & Schulte’s (2009) cost of community services analysis of a low density 
suburb in Virginia found that providing municipal services to large lot homes costs the 
local government $1,600 more than is returned in taxes and other revenues. As a result, 
the entire community will pay more in taxes in the long term to subsidize the cost to 
maintain infrastructure serving low density development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Anonymous in discussion with the author, February 2015. 
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Chapter V: The Relationship among Delay, Cost, and Price 
The previous section demonstrated that regulatory delay creates new costs for the 
community at large. This section explains how delay increases costs to developers and 
eventually prices to end-users. Cost refers to the total costs the developer incurs to 
actually build a project. Price refers to the payment made by the end user to the 
developer. Price and cost are not the same, but increases to cost often results in increases 
to price up to the point that the market will bear. In some cases when the price must rise 
above the market to cover costs and meet returns, developers will abandon the project. 
This next section explores the empirical relationships between time and cost, and 
between time and price. Using time as a proxy for delay, the relationship between delay 
and price becomes evident.  
 
The academic literature and mainstream research which investigates regulatory 
delay is unambiguous in its conclusion that delays in permitting increase real estate prices 
and reduce a city’s overall affordability (Ben-Joseph 2003; Wrenn & Irwin 2015). An 
economic study by PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC) concludes that “higher rents for all 
tenants are caused by permitting delays” (2005). As such higher rents are a product of 
increased development costs. As established by Pindyck (1993), costs outside of the 
control of the developer generated during regulatory delay are referred to as implicit 
costs. The term implicit costs is used throughout this paper to refer to these unforeseen 
costs that the developer accrues during periods of regulatory delay. Ben-Joseph (2003, 
17) summarizes the types of individual expenses within implicit costs: “ultimately, the 
delay caused by the regulatory maze produces higher cost housing through holding costs, 
increased expenses due to risk, uncertainty, overhead, and inflated cost of labor and 
materials, and other more hidden costs.” As discussed previously, the level of stringency 
of land use regulations affects the cost of housing, though there may be quantifiable 
positive externalities generated by some of those. However, “the costs of regulation are 
multiplied as a result of inefficient and duplicative government administrative processes” 
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(Schill 2005, 12). This suggests that delay causes a multiplier effect, where the one-time 
de facto cost of regulation is multiplied by the de jure implicit costs of regulatory delay. 
 
Delay increases total project development costs (time and cost) 
Regulatory delays increases overall total development project costs. PWC found 
that “various economic studies have confirmed that onerous permit processes drive up the 
cost of the building stock” among a variety of communities (2005, 3). Specific implicit 
costs include increased consultant costs and developer overhead (referred to as soft 
costs), and increased carry costs (interest and fees). In Philadelphia, stricken with 
extreme delay, a study found that “delay can add as much as […] 5 percent to the total 
development costs” (Hsueh 2010, 1). The National Association of Home Builders report 
that “10% of the cost of building a typical new home is attributed to unnecessary 
regulation, regulatory delay, and fees” (May 2005, 5). While unnecessary regulation is 
subjective, and fees are found to have a negligible impact, a portion of the 10% is surely 
attributable to delay.  
Peter May’s work (2005, 4) examines barriers to affordable housing posed by 
regulatory implementation and concludes that “delays add to the cost of construction”. 
Austin developers cited situations where because of regulatory delay they had to hire new 
consultants or extend contracts of existing consultants. Eight of 14 developers mentioned 
that the combination of engineer and land use attorney fees, plus permit reapplication and 
revision fees together greatly increased their soft cost budget. One developer needed a 
land use attorney to write a new amendment to the land development code in order for 
him to legally fulfill a discretionary condition placed on the site plan permit applications 
by a city commission.12 Six of 14 developer interviewees mentioned needing attorneys to 
help navigate interpretation discrepancies in grandfathering cases, which often include 
meetings of multiple department directors, assistant city managers, and the city manager.   
                                                 
12 Anonymous in discussion with the author, March 2015.  
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Further, four interviewees (one developer, one engineer, two contractors) 
discussed how Austin based consultants and subcontractors are changing their billing 
model to a time & materials basis as opposed to lump sum, at least for permitting and 
approvals: “all contractors and subs in this case said that they will (if they don’t already) 
now only quote permit obtainment strictly on a time and materials basis.”13 Many are 
losing any profits to delays. Consultants must compensate by either charging time & 
materials for permitting, or readjusting their lump sum fees based on a much longer 
expected timeline for regulatory review. Regulatory delay makes development more 
expensive.  
 
Delay costs the local government  
Delays also increase costs to municipalities. Delays during approvals and 
construction temporarily postpone the delivery of new development, which postpones 
property tax collection. PWC’s study (2005, 1) indicates that “accelerating permit 
processes provides a temporary acceleration of property tax collections.” In this way, 
regulatory reforms could be self-financed through more rapid collection of property 
taxes, especially because by national standards Austin has unusually high property taxes. 
 
Developers pass-on costs to consumers 
Developers will pass on as much cost to the consumers as the market will bear, 
particularly in a strong market such as Austin. Developers pass on implicit costs to 
consumers by spreading these costs out over the number of units in a project. Implicit 
costs are added to each unit’s base cost (cost of construction and cost of capital), which 
increases the end state price of the unit to the consumer. Often the public misperceives 
that developers absorb these implicit costs and therefore receive less in profits. However, 
real estate finance theory indicates developers will pass on their costs to consumers up to 
the point that the market will support. Nine of the 14 developers talked about passing on 
                                                 
13 Anonymous in discussion with the author, February 2015. 
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the costs of delay as a given.14 Developers emphasize the as the market will bear clause, 
especially because Austin’s market has been strong it has essentially made invisible the 
effects of years of regulatory delay on project quality and pricing. The process of 
spreading out costs over all the units is a typical part of the development process in 
Austin and in all strong markets. If developers need to raise prices beyond the point the 
market will bear, land prices must drop in order for deals to work. If landowners are 
unwilling to drop their prices, then the development cannot meet the investor’s and the 
developer’s own expected returns, and thus the project will not be built.   
Developers are not willing to enter a deal knowing that their returns will not meet 
their expectations. Instead developers will invest in another location locally or nationally, 
or develop a different type of real estate. Researchers have for years shown that “the 
extent to which communities recognize the impact that uncertainty and delay have in 
deterring additional construction” is negligible (Mayer 2000, 21). In an older study 
(Seidel 1978), researchers found that the final selling price of housing units increased by 
1-2% for each additional month after the initial completion date.  
Developers operate among a complex stack of capital partners, of which their 
equity is usually the smallest slice. Often during regulatory review, developers and 
lenders have already agreed upon a set number of units and/or amenities to justify the 
land costs and support projected cash flows. A significant delay and/or loss of density to 
a developer at this point means an increase in price for every other remaining unit to 
make up this difference. Alternatively, delay reduces the amount of capital a developer 
has to spend on amenities. However the lender may have already required a pool or 
fitness center as part of loan terms in response to market analysis. In such cases, 
developers must increase future cash flows via rents to cover implicit costs in order to 
deliver amenities. PWC’s study (2005, A-1) notes that “permitting delays raise tenant 
costs both in new buildings and existing buildings. When permitting delays are the norm, 
the increased costs and delayed returns on investment are built into rents paid by all 
                                                 
14 Anonymous in discussion with the author, March 2015. 
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tenants.” When members of the public and city staff perceive that by delaying a project or 
reducing a developer’s density that they are taking money out of his pocket, they are in 
effect actually raising the cost of housing for everyone.   
 
Delay increases end-user prices (time and price)  
As the previous section establishes, developers will pass on as much cost to end-
users as the market will bear. Therefore, delays have a direct impact on price, as research 
also indicates a positive correlation between time and price. A study by renowned 
economists Glaeser & Gyourko (2003, 34) found a statistically significant relationship 
between time and price, where “the increase in time to obtain a permit is strongly 
associated with rising land and housing prices.” This means that there is a linear 
relationship between these two variables, where as time (length of permitting) increases, 
price increases. In a 2003 study, Glaeser conducted a regression analysis where the 
independent variable represents time to permit issuance for a rezoning request against the 
dependent variable as the number of units above 140% of construction costs.  
The results of the regression proved a statistically significant relationship, 
implying that the longer a rezoning permit takes, the more units in a community that are 
priced above 140% of construction costs (Glaeser 2003). This research explains in part 
the widening gap between construction costs and the end-state price of housing (Quigley 
2004). These results can be interpreted to show how delay during rezoning acts as a tax 
on new development. Austin’s Planning and Development Review Department reports 
that there were 217 rezoning cases in 2014. For comparison, Round Rock had 29 cases, 
and San Marcos had 9 cases (Zucker Report 2015). To verify whether the “zoning tax” is 
in effect in Austin, a further study could collect and analyze rezoning case data against 
homes priced above a certain threshold of construction costs in Austin, and do the same 
in Round Rock and San Marcos.  
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Delay constrains the supply of housing  
Delay affects the supply of housing, which interacts with demand to determine 
price. Regulatory delay constricts supply as it lengthens the time it takes to begin 
construction of new housing, and in the long term reduces the number of projects 
entirely. Regulatory delay slows the delivery of new construction. Basic economic theory 
says that as supply is constricted, demand and consumer willingness to pay increases; 
subsequently developers raise rents in response to the supply-constrained market. Studies 
indicate that the “implications of regulatory delays are clear: the financial and time costs 
will reduce steady-state [housing] starts” (Mayer 2000, 13). While only looking at single 
family housing starts, Mayer’s study (2000, 13) found that just “a one standard deviation 
increase in the number of months of delay results in a reduction of 20-25% in the number 
of permits obtained by builders.” Here supply is reduced, affecting the demand curve and 
end user price range.  
 Regulatory delay also decreases the probability of future development. Wrenn & 
Irwin’s work found that “a 1% increase in average expected approval time results in a 
decrease in the probability of development by 0.94%” (Wrenn & Irwin 2015, 34). As 
implicit costs increase via regulatory delay, real options theory15 explains that the 
probability that developers will begin new projects decreases, further tightening the 
housing market supply.  
Not only does the constriction of supply increase consumer costs for new housing, 
it increases costs across the market for existing stock. The market wide effect is that 
delays discourage investment, which results in less construction and a tighter real estate 
market, and “as a result, rents are higher for all tenants” (PWC 2005, 1). This dynamic 
has significant negative effects for long-time residents whose incomes do not inflate at 
the same rate as their property taxes or rents, which can result in displacement. Certainly 
in overbuilt markets delays do not have the same effect on supply, demand, and price, as 
                                                 
15 Real options theory of real estate refers to the process by which a developer considers the amount of 
uncertainty in the market and exercises “options” on when to start a project based on expected future 
returns (Brueggeman 2014).  
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the market is already oversupplied and rents are stagnant. However, in strong under-
supplied markets, this effect is multiplied. Austin’s Real Estate Council published a 
report in 2014 calling for 100,000 new housing units within Austin city limits by 2025 
(RECA 2015). Accordingly, Austin’s housing supply is not overbuilt as demand remains 
high due to continuous population and employment growth, and residents’ desire for high 
quality urban lifestyles. When left to the market, housing supply in Austin does respond 
to demand. For example, in February of 2015 the Austin American Statesman reported 
that after years of rising rents, "Austin area apartment dwellers are about to get some 
relief this year, as thousands of new units enter the market and ease the metro area's 
demand crunch" (Novak 2015). This article suggests that housing supply does indeed 
follow demand, though it took many years to catch up to the point that rents eased.  
 
Delay disproportionally impacts affordable housing developers  
With few exceptions16, affordable housing developers face the same regulatory 
process, site constraints, building codes, and review timelines as market rate developers. 
A recent report by the Urban Land Institute and Enterprise Community Partners (2014) 
titled Bending the Cost Curve posits solutions to lower development costs in order to 
increase viability of affordable housing projects. The report cites delays during regulatory 
processes as a key issue, for example “time delays can have significant cost implications, 
most notably in securing sites and contractor services” (ULI 2014, 16).  
These implicit costs include land option extensions and difficulty locking in hard 
cost prices, issues also faced by market rate developers experiencing delay. Delay may 
actually disproportionately affect affordable housing developers, particularly in their 
ability to assemble the complex and often time-sensitive sources of capital necessary for 
affordable projects. Low income housing tax credits are allocated only once per year, so 
time delays which affect securing land and hard cost prices hurt the affordable housing 
developer’s ability to pull a competitive proposal together.  
                                                 
16 For example, Austin’s S.M.A.R.T. housing program offered expedited review timelines and reduced fees 
for affordable housing development projects.  
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Chapter VI: Costs and the Development Process 
The previous section established a relationship between regulatory delay and 
development costs, and the relationship between costs to the developer and price to the 
consumer. This next section explores when and where in the development process and 
budget the developer incurs implicit costs. A recent ULI report found that “extended time 
frames and unpredictability associated with the zoning, permitting, and entitlement 
process can increase both hard and soft costs” (ULI 2014, 18). Developers I interviewed 
indicated that delays also impact land costs and land option costs.  
   
Soft costs are high 
For a large commercial development project, the developer will prepare a pre-
development budget for costs incurred before financing. There is another larger budget 
for the entire project itself, from site work to vertical construction, and final delivery. In 
both budgets the developer will have a soft cost category, which includes fees for 
architecture, land planning, engineering, entitlements, legal, developer management, and 
other consultants. Typically developers budget upward of $19-22 per square foot (ULI 
Case Studies 2014). Many soft cost budgets are higher because developers often include 
financing costs and contingency in this category. However for the purposes of this study 
these are their own categories in order to test their sensitivity to time delays.    
 
Project consultants such as civil engineers, planners, designers, and land use 
attorneys do strong business in communities with complex land development codes and 
lengthy approval procedures. Consultant costs increase in this environment in two ways: 
1) the developer needs more specialized consultants to navigate the process (e.g. land use 
attorneys), and 2) consultants’ lump sum bids are either higher in anticipation of delays, 
or are only administered on a time and materials basis. In Austin, this is particularly true. 
In correspondence regarding a new project on South Lamar, Mr. Van Hyfte, principal of 
BOKA Powell, who is now well versed in Austin’s code and regulatory process, said his 
firm “has made a living in Austin from working within the city’s rulebook” (Lanane 
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2014). In communities with difficult codes and lengthy approvals such as Austin, 
developers of complex projects use land use attorneys, civil engineers, zoning 
consultants, and design teams that are fluent in the complexity and high levels of scrutiny 
in local procedures. The barriers to entry for planning, design, engineering, and legal 
firms are high in these communities, driving up the cost of existing services. In other 
cities, these costs can be minimal prior to land use approvals, and most of the design 
costs are incurred during financing. Developers in Austin need substantial amounts of 
working capital to get projects approved.  
Further, much of Austin’s land development code has been written by a select few 
land use attorneys over the decades, which creates a dynamic unique to Austin where a 
land use attorney leads the entitlement process. In most communities, a planner or 
landscape architect who is trained in navigating municipal processes and neighborhood 
outreach leads entitlements. Land use attorneys are considerably more expensive than a 
developer’s project manager and planning consultants by up to $500 per hour. In many 
cases developers retain these consultants through the project longer than they would in 
other cities with streamlined permitting, which further increases soft costs.  
As alluded to previously, because of delay consultants are changing the way they 
bid projects to anticipate a lengthy and unpredictable process. For example, smaller 
contractors are bidding on projects only on a time and materials basis instead of a lump 
sum to protect themselves from delays absorbing all of their profits.17 This dynamic 
makes it difficult for developers to predict the ultimate cost of their projects. 
In the 2015 land use landscape of Austin, a prominent civil engineering firm 
reports that the cost to a developer to obtain a site plan permit for a commercial project is 
now more (and in cases of complex projects, considerably more) expensive than 
preparing the engineered site plan itself.18 The sensitivity of rent rates and sales prices of 
                                                 
17 Anonymous in discussions with the author, February and March 2015. 
18 Typically a developer would hire a civil engineer to prepare construction documents and verify that the 
design drawings prepared by land planners and architects are buildable. In Austin, civil engineers are 
increasingly relied upon to navigate the city’s approval process, which has become so time consuming that 
engineers bid more to get projects approved than to engineer the actual plans.  
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new homes to increases in soft costs due to regulatory delay are explored in the next 
section of this paper.   
 
Developers and builders struggle to price land appropriately  
It is more difficult for a developer or builder to price land appropriately if there is 
uncertainty around the delivery date of the development. Regulatory delay makes it 
difficult for a developer to know when the project will deliver, which creates uncertainty 
around price. Uncertainty around the approval process forces developers to consider 
future scenarios for when they should build and what they should build on their land, 
referred to as a “real option” in real estate. The amount of uncertainty in the approval 
process and of future market conditions is an important determinant of present land 
values. Titman's classic work on real options theory indicates that "if the amount of 
uncertainty increases, the value of the vacant land increases, decreasing the relative 
attractiveness of constructing a building at the current time" (Titman 1985, 510). This is 
because if the value of the land exceeds the profit from building at the present date, the 
landowner will choose not to develop/sell the land at the present time.  
To developers, the "decision to build or not build can thus be thought of as 
weighing the opportunity costs associated with keeping the land vacant against the 
expected gain from constructing a more appropriate building in the future" (Titman 1985, 
513). When developers cannot build in uncertain market conditions, two macro-level 
effects occur: either 1) developers build another product type, for example instead of 
multifamily they build office, or 2) developers either build in other jurisdictions with less 
uncertainty, or they do not build at all, which in both cases constrains supply in the 
current market and drives up prices of all existing units. In limited cases, developers with 
a long track record working in Austin, or with insider information or relationships, or 
even flush with cash (like large national companies) can bid up the price of land.  
There is a positive empirical relationship between approval time and land costs. 
Malpezzi’s study (1996, 216) on the effects of regulation on housing prices found that 
“average time for development project approval had a positive and significant effect on 
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land prices.” As the price of land increases, housing prices are directly increased, also 
determined by Malpezzi’s study where “the cost of housing prices were driven primarily 
by the cost of land and construction inputs” (Malpezzi 1996, 215). As construction costs 
have not risen at the same rate as housing prices (Glaeser 2003), research implies that 
land costs and regulatory issues are the most significant factors driving up the price of 
housing in the United States.   
For the purposes of this study, the price of land itself will remain fixed throughout 
the quantitative analysis. However the developer’s option to purchase the land will be 
tested. In order to reduce risk, developers typically do not complete a land purchase until 
after successfully navigating regulatory approvals and receiving permits. Developers will 
pay an option to landowners during the time they seek approvals, known as a land option 
agreement. In a strong market such as Austin, landowners will typically use their 
leverage to contract a penalty option where the monthly payment from the developer does 
not contribute toward the agreed upon purchase price.19 Typically a land option is paid 
monthly by the developer, and so the average 3.5 month delay in Austin requires 
developers to extend their land option agreement by at least four months length of time. 
The cost/price impact of land option extensions is modeled in the next section.  
 
Developers must account for carry costs  
Carrying costs include interest on construction and land loans, property taxes, and 
other costs a developer must ‘carry’ through the construction period while no income is 
generated. Wrenn & Irwin (2015, 24) found that “any policy that extends the time it takes 
to gain final approval for a project will extend the time that capital must be tied up, 
thereby increasing costs and reducing the probability of investments.” Carry costs are 
typically recovered both in future cash flows and upon sale of the development when the 
outstanding loan balance is paid off completely. However, delays “delay revenue 
                                                 
19 Anonymous in discussion with the author, December 2015. 
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generation by postponing the time of sale of the asset,” (Wrenn & Irwin 2015, 25) further 
increasing the amount of cash flow recovery necessary to account for these carry costs. 
As the cost of capital tends to be higher during construction than permanent 
financing, delays during construction are very costly to the developer. One developer in 
Austin reported that every day he carries $2,000 in interest costs alone, citing frustration 
with a delay in the construction inspection process.20 A common source of delay during 
construction in Austin is discrepancies between field inspectors and desk reviewers, who 
may lack the on-site experience to properly enforce regulations or foresee issues in the 
field. Austin based developers report many instances of field inspectors making changes 
to plans on the fly because the site plan reviewers did not catch critical issues during 
review. Four of the 14 developers mentioned lengthy delays in construction due to 
discrepancies between field inspectors and the site and building plans approved by plan 
reviewers in One Texas Center. For example, a consultant representing a developer 
mentioned significant construction delays caused by very lengthy processes to what 
should be straightforward processes such as right-of-way permits: “it will nearly be 
impossible to get a right-of-way permit under two weeks, unless it’s for a parking spot or 
a dumpster. Even then, you’ve got to factor 3-4 days.”21 This process not only increases 
carry costs and delays future income, but often results in one-time monetary losses such 
as change orders to infrastructure or construction materials that are altered by inspectors 
after plans have been approved and started.  
For the purposes of this study, carry costs are calculated using the loan constant of 
a typical commercial multifamily construction loan to estimate the cost of capital for a 
project. Impacts of carry costs on housing prices are tested in the next chapter. 
 
Delay creates uncertainty around hard costs 
Delays during the approvals process creates uncertainty around future hard cost 
prices. Developers cite that hard costs have been increasing 12-15% annually in Austin 
                                                 
20 Anonymous in discussion with the author, March 2015. 
21 Anonymous in discussion with the author, March 2015. 
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for the past three years.22 Extrapolated, hard costs should increase between 4-5% during 
Austin’s typical 3.5 month delay during site plan review. Increases in hard costs 
immediately increase the project’s overall price per square foot, thus hiking base rents. 
This sensitivity is tested in the next chapter.  
  
Ultimately the effect of these implicit costs – soft costs, land and land option 
costs, carry costs, and hard costs – increase the total development project cost and thus 
the price of development to consumers. Regulatory delay results in the delay of future 
anticipated income to the developer and their capital partners. The PWC study notes that 
“longer construction periods delay the receipt of rental income and require a higher level 
of rents relative to costs to be economically viable” (PWC 2005, A-1). In order for a 
project to meet the agreed upon returns between the developer and their equity investors, 
and for the project to be able to cover its debt service ratio, increased rents or sales prices 
relative to the costs of delay are necessary for projects to remain viable.  
 
The next section of this paper quantitatively tests the sensitivity of the implicit 
costs (soft, hard, land, and carry) incurred by developers during regulatory delay on base 
rents of new multifamily housing in Austin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Anonymous in discussion with the author, December 2015. 
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Chapter VII: The Cost of Delay in Austin 
The previous chapters and empirical studies establish that regulatory delay increases 
total development project costs in critical ways: increases to land costs, soft costs, hard 
costs, and carry costs. The previous work also establishes that regulatory delay causes a 
loss of expected rental income to developers. As these implicit costs raise the total cost of 
development relative to original expectations, and because the developer gets paid after 
debt servicers and the preferred return to equity, the implicit costs come out of the 
developer’s pocket during predevelopment. Further, if rents are not raised relative to 
costs, then the developer receives reduced profits both from the cash flows and from the 
sale of the project. Over time, developers will not pursue projects in which they will 
continue to receive less than expected returns. Therefore, in order for the developer to 
maintain her expected profits as originally projected, she will deal with implicit costs in 
the following ways:  
 Pass on costs to consumers by increasing base rents or starting sales price of the 
units, as much as the market will bear;  
 Reduce development costs in other parts of the budget, for example by reducing 
amenities or downgrading finishes; and    
 Draw down contingency funds, if available and if costs occur after financing, 
which reduces the developer’s ability to use this fund to deal with future issues. 
This section of the paper quantifies these impacts and demonstrates how in theory 
developers must raise the price to the consumer to account for the costs accrued during 
regulatory delay. It is important to note, however, that if the developer is to raise prices, 
there must be unique qualities about the project relative to competing projects that justify 
the rents. In this way it becomes difficult to simultaneously remove or downgrade 
amenities, raise prices, and remain competitive. The chart below summarizes the different 
costs that are affected during the site plan review and construction period of the 
development process.  
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Table IV: Costs Impacted During Regulatory Delay  
 
 
Austin is a city of renters. Austin’s recent Comprehensive Housing Market 
Analysis found homeownership rates of 45% unchanged over the last decade, indicting a 
majority 55% of Austin’s residents rent their homes (BBC Research & Consulting 2014, 
6). Nationally, new household formation is primarily comprised of renters as millennials 
and boomers continue to move to inner-cities where rental housing is a dominant option, 
as young people move out of their parents dwellings, and as the United States’ housing 
market continues its slow decline in homeownership. Therefore this analysis focuses on 
how delay increases base rent prices, instead of sales prices, under the assumption that 
most implicit costs can be passed on to consumers because Austin’s market is strong. The 
first section analyses the sensitivity of base rents to delay during site plan review. A brief 
discussion of how delays during construction affect base rent prices follows this section.  
 
Regulatory Delay During Site Plan Review  
Per the City of Austin’s land development code, site plans must be approved 
within 120 calendar days, measured from completeness check through formal approval. I 
will use this 120 day mandate as the benchmark from which to determine a timeframe for 
delay. According to the development review performance measures (2014), the average 
number of calendar days23 for a site plan approval was 223.24 This figure includes all site 
plans including applicants that received time extensions. Including site plans with 
extensions is necessary because as the Zucker Report (2015) identifies through interviews 
                                                 
23 The city only reports the average number of days for approval, which according to case studies and best practices 
from other cities, is not the ideal measurement. A better metric would be to record the minimum and maximum amount 
of days. Other cities subtract the minimum from the maximum to establish average delay in the city. However for the 
purposes of this study I use averages as calculated by the city. The Zucker Report (2015) suggests report “% on-time”.  
24 This number was calculated by averaging the monthly averages for approval times for all site plans for 2014. I 
removed the highest (max) and lowest  (min) average months from the annual averaging process.  
Soft Costs Hard Costs Land Option Carry Equity Carry Loan
SITE PLAN REVIEW x x x
CONSTRUCTION x x x
Costs Effected During Regulatory Delay
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of plan review staff, time extensions are very common, especially for discretionary 
projects. All of the developers interviewed for this project shared stories of delay on 
discretionary projects. As the land development code mandates that site plan review 
approvals should take no more than 120 calendar days, and Austin’s average cycle is 223 
days, the average delay is calculated as 223 minus 120 which equals 103 days. One 
hundred and three days computes to about 3.43 months. Thus rounded this 3.5 months is 
the average recorded delay by the City of Austin for all site plan review cycles. All 14 
developers said it takes them 12 months to gain site plan approvals for discretionary 
projects. As such, the average delay for many projects is likely longer than 3.5 months, 
compounding the costs of delay over this time. However for simplicity, 3.5 months of 
delay is modeled in this paper.  
 
To calculate the impacts of a 3.5 month regulatory delay during site plan 
approvals on development in Austin, I first built a base case scenario for a standard 
multifamily project. For a standard multifamily “Texas donut” project just outside of the 
downtown core, on a per square foot basis I assume $50 for total land (not just buildable 
land), $17 for soft costs, $155 for hard costs, and $8 for financing costs, which includes a 
loan fee (1%) and 20 months of interest carry. Combined these together make a total 
development budget of $230 per square foot. This hypothetical project has 187 units at an 
average 750 square feet for a total size of 161,250 square feet at 85% gross floor area 
efficiency.  
 
Table V: Example Project Assumptions, Central Texas Multifamily   
Project Assumptions
Units 187 Interest Rate (%) 6
Size/Unit 750 Term (Years) 25
Building SF 161,250  Exit Cap Rate (%) 6                
(at 85% efficiency)
Loan Constant 
(Monthly) 0.0064
Loan Constant 
(Annual) 0.0773        
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To verify these costs, I first looked at comparable projects in Central Austin 
(south, east, and northwest markets within five miles of the CBD). I then workshopped 
the proposed budget with seven developers and civil engineers active in Austin and 
incorporated their comments. Rent rates as of April 2015 for five comparable projects are 
available below. Comparatively, the rents that this example project must charge to cover 
costs and returns are the lowest among available rents. Because Austin’s housing market 
is strong, I assume that the developer can and would be able to charge higher rents in the 
current climate.  
Table VI: Current Rental Property Comparables, April 2015  
 
To calculate base rents for this project, I first calculated the borrower’s cost of 
capital using an assumption of 6% interest on a 25 year amortization period. I then 
multiplied this loan constant (cost of capital in Project Assumptions table above) by the 
$230 per square foot base cost. This simple multiplication requires the developer to 
charge annually $17.76 per square foot to the project. I then multiplied the base rents by 
12% to account for the preferred return to the project’s equity source. The developer must 
then yield $19.89 per year on the project, which calculates to base rents of $1.91 per 
square foot per unit. Based on the average unit size in this project, monthly base rents 
would start at $1,430, well within current market comparables as listed in Table VI 
above. The standard housing to income ratio of 30% of monthly income indicates that 
this rent level is available to Austinites earning $51,463 per year, or 97% of median 
family income for a one person household in Travis County (2014).   
Project Location BR/BA SF Monthly PSF
Corazon East 1/1 730 $1,850 $2.53
Hanover South  1/1 726 $1,749 $2.41
Lamar Union South  1/1 796 $1,780 $2.24
Example ‐ Delayed Central 1/1 750 $1,488 $1.98
AMLI Mueller North 1/1 730 $1,445 $1.98
Elan East East  1/1 725 $1,392 $1.92
Example ‐ Original Central 1/1 750 $1,430 $1.91
Source: Online property management
Current rental rates as of April 27, 2015 for 12 month lease
Rental Rates in Central Austin, Delivered 2014‐2015
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Table VII: Base Rent Calculations  
 
I then quantified the implicit costs that a developer would accrue during an extra 3.5 
months of approvals. During this time, developers said that: 
 soft costs increase primarily due to legal fees, as well as developer overhead 
which includes standard overhead charges (rent, project manager salary) as well 
as the opportunity cost of not pursing other deals while dealing with delays 
(calculated using a modest partner salary allocation);  
 hard costs have steadily increased 12-15% annually in Austin for several years. 
Over 3.5 months of delay, it is assumed that hard costs increase by 5%; 
 developers continue to pay an option on the land. During strong markets, the 
option is paid as a penalty (not contributed to the price of the land), and is either a 
fee or calculated as a percent of the purchase price. In this case, developers said 
10% of the purchase price per year is appropriate. Here in this analysis the 
monthly land option rate was calculated using 10%/12 months for four months.  
Together these three implicit costs increase the per square foot costs by $9, from $230 to 
$239. I then multiplied the original loan constant and 12% preferred hurdle rate to this 
Land Cost $50
Soft Cost $17
Hard Cost $155
Financing Costs $8
Total PSF $230
Cost of Capital (PSF 
x Constant) $17.76
Preferred Return 
(Plus 12%) $19.89
Unit PSF/Month $1.91
Monthly Rent $1,430
Renter Income $51,463
Base Rental Rates
Project Costs PSF
Required Rents PSF/Year
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new project cost. This yields a higher base rent rate that a developer must charge if she 
wishes to maintain the development team’s expected profits. The full budget and detailed 
assumptions for this project are available in the Appendix on page 57.  
 
Table VIII: Delayed Rent Calculations  
 
These assumptions are modest. I did not include any increases to engineering or design 
fees, which if included would increase the base rents upwards of 5%. Nor did I include 
more city fees for permit extensions or reapplications, or unexpected costs associated 
with meeting conditions of site plan approval.   
 
Accordingly, the average 3.5 month delay during regulatory approvals in Austin 
requires a developer to increase base rent prices by 4% in order to meet the 
project’s expected returns. Similarly, if delay was eliminated from regulatory 
approvals, renters could expect to save 4% on their monthly rent, which for these 
newly delivered projects in Austin is about $60 per month, or $720 annually.   
Land Cost $50
Soft Cost  $18
Hard Cost  $163
Financing Cost $8
Total PSF $239
Cost of Capital 
(PSF x Constant) $18.48
Preferred Return 
(Plus 12%) $20.70
Unit PSF/Month $1.98
Monthly Rent $1,488
Renter Income $53,555
Post‐Delay Base Rental Rates
 3.5 Months Delay ‐ Site Plan Review
Project Costs PSF
Required Rents PSF/Year
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If the market is not strong enough to bear these rent increases, projects will either 
not get built at all or developers will not be properly compensated for taking entitlement 
risk. Reflected in the table above, this new per month price translates to $1,488, which is 
4% greater than the projected base rents of $1,430 for the same unit in the same project. 
This also increases the per square foot price by nearly ten cents to $1.98. Using the same 
standard 30% of housing to income ratio, this unit is now available to Austinites earning 
$53,555 per year, or 101% of the median family income for one person. Just 3.5 months 
of delay during site plan review begins to remove a small slice from the pool of 
available25 renters.  
 
Table IX: Comparison of Base to Delay Rental Rates 
 
                                                 
25 Available renters refers to unburdened households; that is, households that do not pay more than 30% of their 
income on rent. Of course, nearly 50% of American’s are burdened, but this work assumes that households are able to 
make rational housing decisions based on the 30% housing expense to income ratio.  
Land Cost $50 Land Cost $50
Soft Cost $17 Soft Cost  $18
Hard Cost $155 Hard Cost  $163
Financing Costs $8 Financing Cost $8
Total PSF $230 Total PSF $239
Cost of Capital 
(PSF x Constant) $17.76
Cost of Capital 
(PSF x Constant) $18.48
Preferred Return 
(Plus 12%) $19.89
Preferred Return 
(Plus 12%) $20.70
Unit PSF/Month $1.91 Unit PSF/Month $1.98
Monthly Rent  $1,430 Monthly Rent $1,488
Renter Income $51,463 Renter Income $53,555
4.06%
Base Rental Rates Post‐Delay Base Rental Rates
 3.5 Months Delay ‐ Site Plan Review
% Increase Rent
Project Costs PSF
Required Rents PSF/Year
Project Costs PSF
Required Rents PSF/Year
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While costs are in theory passed-on to consumers, in reality developers will price 
rental units according to the market. Renters will not pay a $60 per month “delay 
premium” to live in a community that is exactly the same as another community nearby. 
Developers will charge as much as the market can bear, which according to the rent 
comparables in Table VI on page 43 could be considerably higher for the example 
project. However because the market in Austin is strong and developers, as evidenced in 
market rate rents, are able to command between $1.92-2.53 per square foot for 
approximately 750 square foot apartments, and because costs require rents of just $1.91 
psf, we can hypothesize that the costs of delay are indeed being passed-on to consumers.  
 
While 103 days is the average, many projects experience longer delays, and of 
course some projects experience no or short delay. As the costs of delay become too high 
to pass-on at one time, the developer will value engineer the project by modifying 
amenities and downgrading finishes on the project to reduce costs relative to rents. If the 
delay is very long and the necessary price increase is so high that it cannot be passed on, 
and the developer can only reduce the hard costs of the project to a point, the project will 
not get built. As the results show, a regulatory delay of 3.5 months would require an 
increase of base rents by 4% in order to meet investor’s and developer’s expectations. 
Over time developers will not continue to build projects that do not meet their expected 
returns, thus decreasing supply if delay persists.  
 
The impacts of this are felt across the housing market. Supply is constricted so 
prices increase across the existing supply. Word of this 4% “uncertainty premium” 
spreads among developers and investors, and hurdle rates will increase across the market 
to account for this risk, which increases base rent prices for all future projects. The 4% 
increase in rent can also be interpreted as a cost premium to account for risk in the Austin 
market due to uncertainty in the regulatory approvals process.  
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Regulatory Delay During Construction  
As identified by interviews with developers, a common form of regulatory delay 
during construction is lag caused by discrepancies in interpreting and enforcing 
construction documents between site plan reviewers and field inspectors. Four developers 
cited examples where during construction, field inspectors make multiple and often 
significant changes to construction documents because the site plan reviewers did not 
properly enforce regulations or correctly amend issues in the plans during the plan review 
cycle.  
This kind of delay during construction has critical impacts. The first is increases 
in one-time hard cost expenses. For example, two different developers had to buy a new 
set of differently sized pipes and culverts for their site work because the site plan 
reviewers did not properly apply the required size, which was not corrected until the field 
inspector caught it, causing significant one-time costs of equipment change orders.26 
These one-time costs come out of the developer’s pocket.  
The second impact, significantly, is an increase to carry costs. The construction 
period is an expensive time in the development process for delays to occur. Each day, the 
developer is carrying interest on construction loans. For the example used in this project, 
with 65% leverage on a $32M project and an annual interest rate of 6%, assuming a 50% 
balance on the construction loan, during 20 months of construction, the developer will 
pay about $55,000 per month, or about $14,000 per week in carry costs alone.  
For example, consultants and developers experience frequent delays obtaining 
right of way permits in Austin. What should be a 2-3 day process is now 2-3 weeks. 
Using the same financial scenario as in the previous example, a two week delay for a 
right of way permit caused by backlogs and inefficient payment systems at the City will 
cost the developer $28,000 in interest (more when compounded), as well as overhead and 
opportunity costs. This seemingly simple regulatory process, when delayed, requires the 
developer to come up with upwards of $40,000.  
                                                 
26 Anonymous in discussion with the author, February 2015. 
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Chapter VIII: Conclusions 
Macro Impacts of Regulatory Delay  
The previous section analyzed how regulatory delay impacts an example project. 
However the impacts that regulatory delay have on an entire market are substantial and 
affect not just the individual project, but land use patterns throughout the region.  
 
Short-term Impacts  
In the short term, developers will control and reduce hard costs as much as 
possible in order to maintain a competitive edge. Sometimes this results in reducing the 
amenities budget and unit finishes, which may decrease the overall quality of the project. 
Implicit costs in the short-term likely come out of the developer’s pocket, however they 
will seek to charge rents as high as the market will bear upon delivery.  
 
Mid-term Impacts  
Each developer and consultant I interviewed expressed frustration, 
disappointment, and discouragement as they navigate Austin’s slow and muddled 
regulatory process. Particularly interesting among interviewee’s emotional reactions are 
the feelings of disappointment and discouragement, because nearly all of the developers 
interviewed expressed interest in pursuing more innovative projects in Austin but face 
regulatory barriers and delays in Austin.  
Two of the 14 developers I spoke with said they will either no longer develop in 
Austin (the city they all call home) or only on a very limited basis, because of this 
“entitlement risk.” Austin is losing quality developers to exurban areas and to competing 
cities such as Round Rock and San Marcos, where it is quicker to develop: “my time is 
limited and working on projects in the City of Austin take too much for the processing”27 
of approvals and plans. Not only is Austin losing quality developers, but common 
regulatory delays in effect incentivize developers to work outside city limits. This 
increases regional growth pressures that fuel congestion and increases municipal liability 
                                                 
27 Anonymous in discussion with the author, March 2015.  
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for far-flung infrastructure and leapfrog development patterns. Regulatory delay by the 
City of Austin produces the exact opposite of “compact and connected” development.  
 
Long-term Impacts  
As regulatory delays continue to plague projects and drive up base rents to cover 
costs, investors will begin to increase their hurdle rates to account for this regulatory risk. 
As hurdle rates increase across the market, two major impacts occur over time: 1) base 
rents and base sales prices are higher across the board, eliminating possibilities for 
attainably priced housing as the minimum cost of the cheapest feasible development 
increases; and 2) reduced land values, which prevents landowners from selling until 
market conditions improve, which ultimately slows development across the market.  
In this situation, land values are reduced because as hurdle rates increase, the 
projected reversion price of the project decreases. Once construction costs are subtracted 
from the projected sale price, the residual amount leftover to pay for land is less, thus the 
developer’s ability to pay for land is decreased. According to real options theory, the 
uncertainty around the length of approvals will make landowners less likely to sell to 
developers, since developers cannot pay as much for land as they otherwise would have 
in a more certain regulatory market.  
 
 
Factors for Further Study  
There are several other factors that likely increase base rents even further that 
could be explored in future studies. These factors include:  
 
How much expected future cash flow is lost due to regulatory delay?  
In theory the developer will need to make up postponement of rental income by 
increasing base rents in order for the net operating income in the year of sale to produce a 
reversion price that meets expected equity returns, pays off the outstanding loan balance, 
and meets the developer’s expected profit.    
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What is the opportunity cost of not pursuing another project?  
Developers who lost time to regulatory delay could instead have been pursuing 
other real estate deals. It would be interesting to quantify the opportunity cost of not 
pursuing other deals while losing time to delays, which is considered a “waste” as delay 
decreases a project’s net present value.  
 
What are the impacts of compounding? 
In this analysis, I did not account for compounding when calculating interest carry 
during construction. By accounting for interest compounding in the construction loan, 
carry costs are higher.  
 
How long is too long?  
It is difficult to predict exactly how much of an increase to the base rent rate the 
market can bear. Developers say that renters will only pay what they can afford to pay. In 
these interviews, developers had assumptions based on experience, but it would be 
interesting to investigate more case studies to understand the limits of regulatory delay, 
and how it impacts small versus large developers and developments. 
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Final Thoughts  
Enforcing existing permitting timeframes is the most straightforward, cheapest, 
and least politically sensitive action a city can take to reduce or maintain the cost of 
development and housing prices. This action is entirely within the city’s administrative 
control, and unlike other public improvements supported by bonds, no public vote is 
required to make a change. As of April 2015 changes within the city planning 
department’s bureaucratic composition provides a path for reducing delays. Austin’s 
housing market, because it is so strong, has been able to bear annual increases to base 
rents in the range of 4-5% only because of its exceptionally strong population and jobs 
growth. We must consider that demand will slow eventually and investor’s expectations 
will increase as risk increases.  
In this case, the market may not be able to absorb such increases to base rents, 
which will constrict the supply of housing in the entire Austin area and raise housing 
prices for everyone. As affordability considerations are of utmost importance, the 
deteriorated quality of the built environment caused by regulatory delays is striking. If 
Austin’s leaders and citizens truly want our city to evolve into a livable, prosperous, and 
inclusive heartland city, much work is to be done to incentivize the kind of development 
and growth we admire in peer cities. As much predictability in timing and process as a 
city and its neighborhood groups can provide the development community, the greater 
the development and design team can produce housing that is both high in quality and 
attainable in price.  
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APPENDIX: PROJECT BUDGET ASSUMPTIONS 
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